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COMMENTS
PLAYING BY ALL THE RULES: HOW TO
DEFINE AND PROVIDE A "PRIOR
OPPORTUNITY FOR CROSS-
EXAMINATION" IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
CASES AFTER CRA WFORD V. WASHINGTON
PRUDENCE BEIDLER CARR*
In 2004, the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington and
announced a new rule of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Under Crawford, courts must exclude all out-
of-court statements when those statements were (1) given by a witness who
is unavailable to testify at trial and (2) considered "testimonial" in nature,
unless (3) the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
witness who offered the statements. Crawford has introduced a challenging
problem in child sexual abuse cases where children are often unavailable to
testify at trial; their out-of-court allegations of abuse are now regularly
excluded for their "testimonial" nature. This development is problematic
because children's recollections of events constitute critical evidence in
child sexual abuse prosecutions. The question thus arises: how can
prosecutors continue to hold child sexual abusers accountable for their
crimes while upholding the Crawford rule of confrontation? Many scholars
have explored solutions to this dilemma by examining the first two prongs
of the Crawford rule-witness unavailability and the testimonial nature of
ex parte statements. This Comment suggests, however, that the solution lies
in the third prong-the "'prior opportunity for cross-examination."
Specifically, this Comment recommends that state legislatures implement a
rule of criminal procedure that allows both prosecutors and defendants in
* For their thoughtful advice and assistance editing this piece, I would like to thank the
staff at the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology and Professor Ronald J. Allen. For his
ongoing support, I would like to thank my husband Kevin Carr.
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sexual abuse cases an opportunity to record a child's pretrial testimony and
cross-examination on videotape. This rule would safeguard criminal
defendants' confrontation rights while also protecting against the Crawford
rule's overly burdensome effects on child sexual abuse prosecutions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him ....1
[A] State's interest in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse
victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a
defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court.
2
In 2004, the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington3 and
reassessed the standards for admitting ex parte statements in criminal trials
under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia introduced the following rule: "Where testimonial
evidence is at issue ... the Sixth Amendment demands what the common
law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination." 4 The Crawford rule of confrontation has had an enormous
impact throughout criminal law. Its effects have been felt perhaps most
dramatically, however, in child sexual abuse (CSA) cases.
A. VICTIM TESTIMONY: THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM
Child sexual abuse typically occurs in private locations without other
witnesses, and the passage of time between the alleged abuse and its
disclosure often precludes conclusive physical examinations.5
Consequently, it is common for victim testimony to constitute the principal
evidence on which CSA prosecutions rely. It is difficult to ensure that a
child will be able to relay this evidence at trial, however, because children
I U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990).
' 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
4 Id. at 68. But see id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that the
adoption of a new rule was not well-founded and introduced new types of uncertainty in
interpreting the Confrontation Clause).
5 See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) ("Child abuse is one of the most
difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses
except the victim."); see also John C. Yuille et al., Interviewing Children in Sexual Abuse
Cases, in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES 95, 95-96 (Gail Goodman & Bette Bottoms eds.,
1993) (commenting that child sexual abuse usually takes place in private settings where
there are no witnesses, and physical evidence of abuse is typically inconclusive, since
children heal quickly and do not always disclose details of the abuse immediately).
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are regularly "unavailable" to testify in court.6 Children's unavailability to
testify at trial stems from a variety of causes, including fear of the
courtroom and of the defendant,7 diminished memory of events,8 and an
inability to answer questions and articulate details clearly.9 Children's
unavailability is also often tied to their age at the time of the alleged abuse
and at the time of trial.10 Because these causes of children's unavailability
are typically not remediable, they can often serve to exclude children's
voices from being heard altogether in CSA cases, even when the child's
testimony is the primary evidence on which the CSA prosecution relies.
Prior to the Crawford v. Washington decision in 2004, courts across
the country recognized the risk that excluding children's voices from CSA
trials could undermine CSA prosecutions. They responded to this risk by
applying looser standards for admitting out-of-court or ex parte testimony
in CSA cases. If a child was unavailable to testify in court during a CSA
trial, courts chiefly adopted two specific methods for ensuring that her
6 NANCY WALKER PERRY & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE CHILD WITNESS 138 (1991)
(explaining that children are often unavailable to testify at trial because they would be
traumatized by the courtroom experience); see 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(B) (2000) (listing
grounds for finding unavailability).
7 See, e.g., Contreras v. State, 910 So. 2d 901, 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding a
child witness unavailable because testifying against her father in a CSA trial would likely
have led to her suffering severe trauma); People v. T.T. (In re T.T.), 815 N.E.2d 789, 795-96
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (finding a child witness unavailable when she froze on the stand and
could not answer any more questions from the prosecution after saying that the defendant
had tried to unbutton her pajama suit); see also Gail S. Goodman & Alison Clarke-Stewart,
Suggestibility in Children's Testimony: Implications for Sexual Abuse Investigations, in THE
SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN'S RECOLLECTIONS 92, 102 (John Doris ed., 1991) (explaining
that abusers often make children promise to keep the abuse a "secret" from others); L.
Christine Brannon, The Trauma of Testifying in Court for Child Victims of Sexual Assault v.
the Accused's Right to Confrontation, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 439, 439 (1994) (citing
studies that show how testifying against an assailant in court, especially if the abuser is a
family member, is the most traumatic aspect of the legal process for child victims of sexual
abuse).
8 See, e.g., State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 561 (N.D. 2006) (finding a child unavailable
as a witness because she lacked a sufficient memory of events).
9 See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 129 P.3d 646, 649 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (finding a child
unavailable as a witness because she did not understand the proceedings, the questions, or
her duty to testify truthfully).
10 See, e.g., People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding a
four-year-old child unavailable in a preliminary hearing after she "failed to respond to most
of the questions that she was asked" and "could not express herself so as to be understood");
State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), aff'd, 711 N.W.2d 508 (Minn.
2006) (CSA case involving a three-year-old unavailable victim); Blue, 717 N.W.2d at 561
(attributing a five-year-old child witness's unavailability to her lack of memory concerning
the incidents); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349, 352 (Or. 2004) (CSA case involving a three-
year-old victim who was unavailable to testify).
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voice could still be heard. First, government agents such as police officers
and caseworkers who had interviewed the child about the alleged abuse
could relay the contents of their interviews through broad hearsay
exceptions.11 Second, prosecutors could introduce children's videotaped
pretrial statements even if the defendant had not had an opportunity to
cross-examine the child. 2
Both of these methods-the relay of ex parte testimony through
another's testimony and the use of prerecorded video statements-ensured
that a child's voice could be heard at trial. However, these methods also
overly benefited CSA prosecutors and infringed on criminal defendants'
constitutional right to confront all witnesses against them. For example,
when prosecutors used government agents to relay a child's ex parte
testimony, the defendant could only cross-examine the messenger, rather
than the source of information. 13 Moreover, the use of government agents
to relay a child's statements gave prosecutors the opportunity to shape their
victims' voices in a way that would best suit their case.' 4 Prosecutors also
gained unfair advantages when they used a videotaped statement to relay a
child's pretrial testimony because defendants could not cross-examine the
video statement.15
Prior to Crawford, trial judges could apply these looser evidentiary
rules in CSA cases because the Supreme Court gave them broad discretion
to admit ex parte testimony that met certain "particularized guarantees of
11 See, e.g., In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 793 (before Crawford, the trial court allowed an
investigating social worker and police officer to testify about what they had heard from the
CSA victim because the child was unavailable to testify); see also Robert P. Mosteller,
Crawford's Impact on Hearsay Statements in Domestic Violence and Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REv. 411, 412 (2005) [hereinafter Mosteller, Crawford's Impact]
(noting that before Crawford, prosecutors often admitted children's hearsay statements
through police, government investigators, and specialized medical investigating team
witnesses).
12 See, e.g., Contreras, 910 So. 2d at 903 (prior to the Crawford decision, upon finding
the child unavailable to testify, the trial court admitted the child's videotaped interview with
a child protection worker in which she alleged that her father had sexually abused her).
13 See, e.g., id. The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause was designed to prevent the
government from abusing its prosecutorial powers by ensuring that criminal defendants have
an opportunity to test the reliability of all testimony offered against them. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be
confronted with the witnesses against him .. "); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49
(2004).
14 See, e.g., Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 755 (prior to Crawford, the prosecutor admitted
an unavailable child victim's ex parte statements in part through a police officer's trial
testimony).
15 See, e.g., Contreras, 910 So. 2d at 903.
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trustworthiness."' 16  Additionally, state legislatures condoned the use of
looser standards in CSA cases because they served the greater public policy
goal of protecting children while prosecuting CSA crimes. 17 Despite the
compelling public interests at issue, however, there remained a key problem
with allowing prosecutors to circumvent the Confrontation Clause in CSA
cases: children's allegations about sexual abuse are not always true. 18 In
fact, children's testimony can become heavily influenced by parental
influence, suggestive interview questions, and confusion about what is and
is not pleasing to adult investigators. 19 To prevent the admission of false or
misleading testimony, CSA cases therefore require reliability testing that
extends beyond mere judicial instinct concerning the "trustworthiness" of a
child's ex parte statement.2 °
16 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); see, e.g., Contreras, 910 So. 2d at 904
(finding that the trial court relied on the test of reliability that was established in Roberts, and
later overruled by Crawford). The trial judge determined that the prosecutors had done a
sufficient job showing the trustworthy nature of the child's ex parte statements such that
cross-examination was not necessary. Id. In particular, the judge predicted that "cross-
examination of the child, had it been possible without traumatizing her, would not have
yielded any concessions by her that would have lessened or significantly altered her
statement." Id.
17 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990) ("[A] State's interest in the physical
and psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to
outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant's right to face his or her accusers in court.");
see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) ("The prevention of sexual
exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a government objective of surpassing
importance.").
18 John E.B. Myers, Adjudication of Child Sexual Abuse Cases, FUTURE CHILD.,
Summer/Autumn 1994, at 84, 85 (noting that children are unlikely to lie deliberately about
sexual abuse claims but that they may be "coached or led" into believing untrue stories about
how they have been abused); WALKER PERRY & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 6, at 139.
19 Goodman & Clarke-Stewart, supra note 7, at 103; see Charles Brainerd & Peter A.
Ornstein, Children's Memory for Witnessed Events: The Developmental Backdrop, in THE
SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN'S RECOLLECTIONS, supra note 7, at 10, 15 (explaining that
tainting a child's recollection of events can happen quite accidentally, merely through
exposure to other accounts in which a child's original recollection can be influenced by
leading questions, and a desire to please adults, especially adults in authority); see also
Annabelle Hall, Cross-Examining the Child Witness: Preparation, Style, and Execution,
CRIM. PRAC. GUIDE, Apr. 2000, at 3, 3 (advising criminal defense attorneys on how to cross-
examine children in sexual assault cases by providing the following mantra, "The child is not
lying; the child is not telling the truth."). As Hall explains, it is extraordinarily difficult to
prove that a child is lying, but it is much more likely that a defense attorney can use the
procedure of cross-examination to show that a child may have made a mistake, pretended,
been mixed up, not understood the events in question, or been "doing someone else's
bidding." Id.; see also Myers, supra note 18, at 86 (explaining that young children,
especially those of preschool age, can be more suggestible than older children and adults).
20 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (pointing to the circularity of the
"trustworthiness" test by explaining that dispensing with confrontation because testimony
2007]
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B. CONFRONTATION: THE SOURCE OF THE SOLUTION
Confrontation provides the paramount reliability test, which is why it
was included in the Sixth Amendment.21 Substitutes for confrontation, such
as cross-examining government witnesses about a victim's testimony or
reliance on judicial discretion concerning a statement's general
trustworthiness, cannot satisfy the Constitution's explicit protections for
criminal defendants.22  In 2004, the Supreme Court revitalized this
argument when it provided the new Crawford rule of confrontation, which
bars all testimonial out-of-court statements when a witness is unavailable to
testify at trial unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
that witness. 23 Then, in 2006, the Supreme Court made it clear that this rule
extends to all criminal prosecutions, including those that often involve
24unavailable witnesses. By requiring that all criminal defendants have an
opportunity to confront the testimony offered against them, the Crawford
rule of confrontation has thus addressed one key problem in CSA cases: the
need to let defendants test the reliability of children's allegations.
While the other issues surrounding CSA cases-the need to protect
children from the trauma of testifying at trial and the need to admit
children's statements into evidence-have not disappeared, the Crawford
rule has made it much more difficult to admit children's ex parte statements
in CSA trials.25 As a result, over the past three years the Crawford rule of
presents "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" was "akin to dispensing with jury
trial because a defendant is obviously guilty"); see also Craig, 497 U.S. at 868 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.) ("The 'special' reasons that exist
for suspending one of the usual guarantees of reliability in the case of children's testimony
are perhaps matched by 'special' reasons for being particularly insistent upon it in the case
of children's testimony.").
21 See State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 104 (1794) ("[I]t is a rule of the common
law, founded on natural justice, that no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had
not the liberty to cross examine.").
22 Moreover, allowing Confrontation Clause violations, even for an interest as
compelling as prosecuting child sex abusers, is equivalent to prosecuting a defendant without
the due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no State shall
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
23 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 ("Where testimonial evidence is at issue.., the Sixth
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity
for cross-examination.").
24 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). Both of the cases at issue in Davis
concerned domestic violence, which the Court recognized as a type of crime that often
involves victims who are so susceptible to intimidation and coercion that they do not testify
at trial, thus "giv[ing] the criminal a windfall." Id. at 2280. Nevertheless, the Court was
equally clear in explaining that this unfair advantage fails to justify the vitiation of a
defendant's constitutional rights to confront all testimony offered against him. Id.
25 See discussion infra Section IV.B.
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confrontation has often functioned not to test the reliability of children's
statements but rather to exclude children's voices from sexual abuse trials.
26
The purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of
evidence offered against criminal defendants; it is not intended to eliminate
the use of that evidence altogether.27 Consequently, as it currently operates,
the Crawford rule of confrontation advantages CSA defendants well beyond
its intended purpose.
C. CENTERING THE SEESAW
Weighing the unfair advantages possessed by CSA prosecutors before
Crawford with those that have emerged for defendants as a consequence of
the new rule, an inevitable question arises: Should we sacrifice the
prosecution's case, excluding the most critical evidence-the victim's
voice-or should we sacrifice the alleged abuser's defense, displacing
constitutional confrontation rights by admitting children's out-of-court
allegations without testing the reliability of those statements?
Because sexual abuse is such an abhorrent crime and one that tends to
rile the public, a knee-jerk public policy reaction might lead us to take the
latter route and sacrifice the defendant. 28  However, even the best-
intentioned public policy concerns do not justify a suspension of
constitutional rights.29 The goal then is to balance the seesaw of advantages
by developing rules of CSA confrontation that harmonize society's interests
in protecting children and prosecuting sex abusers with the preservation of
the criminal defendant's right to test the reliability of all testimony offered
against him.3°
This Comment proposes a method for meeting that goal by looking
both at the recent Crawford case and at the cases leading up to it with
regard to child victim testimony in CSA trials. Section II.A begins by
examining the admission of child victim testimony in CSA cases prior to
Crawford.3' This section focuses on two particular issues: the
trustworthiness of ex parte testimony and definitions of sufficient
26 See discussion infra Section IV.
27 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990).
28 For an example of other evidentiary standards that have recognized exceptions for sex
abuse cases in particular, see FED. R. EVID. 413-415 (concerning the admission of prior
crimes evidence in child sexual abuse-an exception to criminal law in general).
29 See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279-80 (standing for the principle that the constitutional
guarantee of confrontation may not be suspended simply because it has the effect of giving
the criminal defendant "a windfall").
30 See Craig, 497 U.S. at 849.
31 See discussion infra Section II.A.
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confrontation in CSA cases. Section II.B then analyzes the Supreme
Court's recent opinions in Crawford and Davis v. Washington.32 Section III
looks at the effects that Crawford and Davis have had on CSA cases and
explains why previous suggestions for mitigating these effects provide
inadequate solutions to the problems at issue.33
Finally, Section IV proposes a way that unavailable child victims'
voices can be heard in the courtroom while still upholding the defendant's
right to test the reliability of a child's allegations under the Crawford rule of
confrontation.34 Specifically, this section focuses on the importance of
looking beyond the Crawford decision to define what it means to provide
criminal defendants with a "prior opportunity for cross-examination.,
35
Only by defining and addressing this component of the Crawford rule can
the Confrontation Clause's goal of reliability testing be successfully
attained without jeopardizing the public's interest in protecting child
victims while prosecuting CSA crimes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. SETTING THE PRE-CRA WFORD STAGE
Prior to Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court heard a range of
cases concerning the nexus between confrontation requirements and the
admissibility of children's statements in CSA trials. These cases fell into
two categories: 36 those that assess the "trustworthiness" of ex parte
statements when a child is unavailable to testify at trial,37 and those that
define sufficient confrontation when a child testifies at trial in an alternative
format.38
1. The Admissibility of Ex Parte Statements
Prior to Crawford, the admissibility of ex parte testimony from
unavailable witnesses was evaluated using a reliability test established in
32 See discussion infra Section II.B.
33 See discussion infra Section III.
34 See discussion infra Section IV.
35 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); discussion infra Section IV.
36 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (clarifying this distinction by
explaining that "the question of what in-court procedures are constitutionally required to
guarantee a defendant's confrontation right" is distinct from the question of "what
requirements the Confrontation Clause imposes as a predicate for the introduction of out-of-
court declarations").
37 See, e.g., White, 502 U.S. 346; Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
38 See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
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Ohio v. Roberts.39 Roberts allowed an unavailable witness's out-of-court
statement to be admitted at trial as long as it exhibited certain "indicia of
reliability." Specifically, the ex parte statement needed either to fall within
a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception or to bear "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness., 40  Both of these determinations were left to judicial
discretion.4' Once a judge determined that an unavailable witness's ex
parte statement bore the necessary indicia of reliability, that statement could
then be offered at trial through the testimony of another witness or through
a previously recorded video- or audiotape.42  Neither of these methods
allowed the criminal defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the witness
directly. Instead, under the Roberts rule, a defendant's right to confront the
witness at trial was nullified by a judge's determination that the unavailable
witness's ex parte testimony was reliable.43
Several years after establishing the Roberts rule of admissibility, the
Court applied it to two different CSA cases. In Illinois v. White, the Court
identified what constitutes a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception in a CSA
case. 44  In particular, the Court determined that a four-year-old child's
allegations of sexual abuse as shared with her babysitter, her mother, an
investigating police officer, and the emergency room personnel who
interviewed the child were all admissible under established exceptions to
the hearsay rule.45 The Court reasoned in part that these declarations were
admissible because of their substantial probative value and because the
child's spontaneity in making these statements could not be duplicated by
future testimony in court even if the child were available to testify.46 Thus,
in White, the Supreme Court affirmed that the Roberts rule hearsay
exception applies in CSA cases.
'9 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Though Roberts did not specifically concern CSA issues, it
provided a general rule of ex parte admissibility under the Confrontation Clause.
40 Id. at 66.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 73. Notably, Roberts involved a situation in which the ex parte statement at
issue came from pretrial testimony during which the defendant actually had the opportunity
to cross-examine the witness. Id. at 58. Consequently, even though it limited defendants'
confrontation rights, the Court retained an emphasis on the value of providing some
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, even if that opportunity did not occur at trial.
43 Id.
44 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
41 Id. at 356-57. The Court identified the child's statements as hearsay under the excited
utterance and medical diagnosis exceptions.
46 Id. Foreshadowing the Crawford opinion, Justices Thomas and Scalia wrote a
concurring opinion in White, in which they explained that while they agreed with the case's




In Idaho v. Wright, another CSA case to reach the Supreme Court, the
Court examined the "guarantees of trustworthiness" component of the
Roberts rule as it applied to ex parte testimony.47 Wright concerned
statements that a young girl made in response to her examining pediatrician
during a CSA investigation.48 The child, who was three years old at the
time, was unavailable to testify at trial because she could not communicate
with the jury.49 Consequently, the prosecutor attempted to admit her ex
parte statements through the pediatrician's trial testimony. 0  As the
statements came after rather than during a physical examination and were
elicited in response to leading questions from the pediatrician, they did not
fall under either the excited utterance or medical diagnosis hearsay
exceptions. 5' After examining the totality of the circumstances, the Court
found that the child's statements also lacked the necessary "guarantees of
trustworthiness" to fall under the Roberts exception because the child had
been questioned in a suggestive manner.5 2 Thus, admitting them would
violate the defendant's confrontation rights. The Wright Court did not
provide much direction about what circumstances would lead to a finding of
"trustworthiness" in CSA situations. It did, however, consider the lower
court's suggestion that the statements would have been sufficiently
trustworthy had the doctor videotaped her interview with the child so that
jurors could determine the statement's reliability on their own.5 3
Ultimately, the Court neither approved of nor rejected the lower court's
proposed requirement that doctors use a videotape to establish
trustworthiness when relaying statements from a child interview. 4
2. Sufficient Confrontation
At about the same time that it addressed questions concerning the
admissibility of ex parte statements in CSA cases, the Supreme Court also
addressed a second question concerning the Confrontation Clause and CSA
47 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
48 Id. at 810-11.
49 Id. at 809.
50 Id. at 810-11.
5' Id. at 827.
52 Id. at 826.
51 Id. at 818-19.
54 Id. (explaining that though the procedural guidelines identified by the lower court may
enhance the reliability of children's ex parte out-of-court statements regarding sexual abuse,
the Supreme Court declined to detail the specific procedural requirements of the
Confrontation Clause with regards to child interviews).
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cases. Specifically, the Court examined what constitutes sufficient
confrontation by looking at two different CSA cases. 5
5
Coy v. Iowa concerned the constitutionality of a state law under which
CSA victims could testify in court with a screen placed between themselves
and the defendant, even without a showing that the child would be
traumatized by face-to-face cross-examination. 6 Justice Scalia wrote for a
plurality, explaining that any law that weakens a defendant's right to "face
to face" confrontation must depend on more than a mere "generalized
finding. 57  Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in Coy, finding
that, while preferable, "face to face" cross-examination is not an "absolute"
component of the confrontation right.58
Two years later, Justice O'Connor had the opportunity to expand upon
her concurrence in Coy when she wrote the majority opinion in Maryland v.
Craig.59  Craig presented a similar issue because it questioned the
constitutionality of a statute under which CSA victims could give testimony
at trial outside the defendant's physical presence, using a one-way closed
circuit television.60 In contrast with Coy, however, the statute at issue in
Craig allowed this method of confrontation only upon a finding that the
particular child would be traumatized by facing the defendant in court.6 '
The Court upheld the Maryland statute by emphasizing three main
points. First, the Court focused on the central purpose of the Confrontation
Clause-to ensure the reliability of all evidence offered against a criminal
defendant.62 The Court explained that in certain situations, such as in CSA
cases, forcing procedural requirements such as face-to-face cross-
examination can hinder rather than help the attainment of this goal. For
example, the experience of facing the defendant in court could "so
overwhelm the child" that it hinders her ability to provide effective
55 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (involving a CSA situation where the child
witness was permitted to testify in court without directly facing the defendant); Coy v. Iowa,
487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (same).
56 Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014.
57 Id. at 1021.
58 Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun took this reasoning a step
further and dissented, arguing that a significant state interest, such as the interest in
protecting child victims from trauma, can justify a "limited departure" from the face-to-face
component of confrontation. Id. at 1025 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
9 Craig, 497 U.S. 836.
60 Id. at 840.
61 Id. at 844-45.
62 Id. at 845.
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testimony and would thus undermine the "truth-finding function of the trial
itself.
63
Second, the Court reasoned that while certain methods of
confrontation, such as "face to face" cross-examination, are preferable, they
must sometimes cede to public policy concerns, such as the protection of
children from trauma.64 Third, the Court explained that cross-examination
alone is not synonymous with confrontation. Instead, the Craig Court
highlighted the importance of several other aspects of sufficient
confrontation-including oath taking and the opportunity for a trier of fact
to observe the witness's demeanor while testifying.65  In fact, the Craig
Court found that before any alternative modes of cross-examination can be
permitted, these other aspects must be present to protect a criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right.6 6
3. Take-Away Rules Preceding Crawford
Thus, before Crawford, the Supreme Court had established several key
rules concerning the admission of child victim testimony in sexual abuse
trials. First, pursuant to Illinois v. White and Idaho v. Wright, when
children were unavailable to testify at trial their ex parte testimony could
still be admitted at trial. However, to be admissible, those statements had to
either fall within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception or bear other
63 Id. at 857; see also Rhona Flin, Commentary, A Grand Memory for Forgetting, in THE
SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN'S RECOLLECTIONS, supra note 7, at 21, 23 (explaining that a
highly stressful situation such as testifying in a courtroom can lead to a child witness's
impaired performance). But see Craig, 497 U.S. at 866 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
exceptions for fear of the defendant undermine the very object of the Confrontation Clause).
64 Craig, 497 U.S. at 853-54 (recognizing that a state's interest in the "physical and
psychological well-being of child abuse victims" is an interest of such magnitude that it may
outweigh a defendant's right to face his accusers directly at trial).
Initially this holding stirred some contradictory case law among the lower courts because,
though the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly state that confrontation must be face-to-face,
several state constitutions do include face-to-face provisions. See, e.g., People v. Fitzpatrick,
633 N.E.2d 685, 688-89 (I11. 1994) (holding that the Child Shield Act provision allowing
children to testify by closed circuit television violated the defendant's state constitutional
right to "face to face" confrontation); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594 A.2d 281, 282 (Pa.
1991) (holding that the use of a closed circuit television to transmit a child witness's
testimony in a sexual abuse case violated the Pennsylvania Constitution, which requires that
all criminal defendants have a right to meet witnesses "face to face"). Two such states,
Illinois and Pennsylvania, have subsequently amended their constitutions to meet the more
general terms of the federal confrontation requirements following Craig. ILL. CONST. art. I,
§ 8 (amended in 1994 to eliminate the "face to face" requirement of confrontation); PA.
CONST. art. I, § 9 (amended in 1995 to eliminate the "face to face" requirement).
65 Craig, 497 U.S. at 845-46.
66 Id. at 858.
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guarantees of trustworthiness. Excited utterance and medical diagnosis
were two common justifications for hearsay admission in CSA cases.
Trustworthiness determinations required a totality of the circumstances
review, but courts could consider such things as the use of a videotape to
record the statements when making that determination.
Second, pursuant to Coy v. Iowa and Maryland v. Craig, sufficient
confrontation could be satisfied even when traditional procedures such as
face-to-face cross-examination were suspended. However, these
procedures could only be suspended upon a finding of necessity for the
individual case. Moreover, under Craig, sufficient confrontation required
more than just cross-examination; it also required oath-taking and the
opportunity for the trier of fact to perceive the witness. Finally, Craig
provided the guiding principle that when suspending traditionally applied
confrontation procedures courts should focus on the ultimate goal of the
Confrontation Clause-the attainment of reliable testimony.
B. THE CONFRONTATION SEA CHANGE: CRA WFORD V WASHINGTON
AND DAVIS V WASHINGTON
In March 2004, the Supreme Court decided Crawford.67 In so doing,
the Court overruled the Roberts rule's "guarantees of trustworthiness"
standard for admitting ex parte statements, and provided instead that:
"Where testimonial evidence is at issue ... the Sixth Amendment demands
what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.,
68
1. Crawford: A Lesson in History and Linguistics
Crawford offered Justice Scalia a long-awaited opportunity to redefine
the scope of the Confrontation Clause. 69  He approached this task by
revisiting British common law, in which he focused on Sir Walter Raleigh's
1603 trial for treason as an example of a "paradigmatic confrontation
violation., 70 Prior to Raleigh's trial, Lord Cobham, his alleged accomplice,
provided testimony against Raleigh both "in an examination before the
67 541 U.S. 36(2004).
68 Id. at 68.
69 Cf Illinois v. White, 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J.,
concurring) (noting that Confrontation Clause interpretation has "evolved in a manner that is
perhaps inconsistent with the text and history of the Clause itself"); Craig, 497 U.S. at 866
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that allowing exceptional circumstances such as fear of the
defendant to serve as a basis for suspending a defendant's confrontation rights undermined
the very purpose of the Confrontation Clause).
70 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
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Privy Council and in a letter.",71 Though Cobham did not testify at trial, the
government used his ex parte statements against Raleigh at trial.72 The jury
subsequently convicted Raleigh of treason, and he was sentenced to death.73
Scalia asserted that nearly two hundred years later, the injustice of
admitting ex parte evidence that had not been cross-examined resounded in
the minds of those who drafted the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.74 Consequently, as a check on governmental abuses of
prosecutorial power, they provided a procedural safeguard for testing the
reliability of witness testimony when they wrote that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the
witnesses against him."
75
Scalia determined that the Roberts test of reliability strayed too greatly
from the historical principles on which the Confrontation Clause was
written. He thus purported to replace it with a more predictable
framework.76 To devise his own interpretation of the clause, Scalia
examined the words "witnesses against," as they appear in the Sixth
Amendment.77 He parlayed this phrase into the idea that a "witness[]
against" a defendant is a witness who offers "testimony" against the
defendant.78 Turning to Webster's American Dictionary for assistance,
Scalia interpreted "testimony" to mean a "solemn declaration or affirmation
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.",
7 9
Finally, to apply that definition to the question of when an unavailable
witness's ex parte statements should be admissible at trial, Scalia drew a
distinction between ex parte statements that are "testimonial" and those that
are not. 80 He did not provide a detailed description of what constitutes a
"testimonial" statement, recognizing instead that there would be at least
"' Id. at 44.
72 Id. (Despite Raleigh's assertions that the witness against him had lied to save himself,
and that surely his accuser would recant if forced to appear before the accused, the judges
refused. Raleigh's plea to "let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my
face" went unanswered.).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 45-46.
75 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49 (quoting State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1
Hayw.) 103, 104 (1794), as evidence that the drafters' intention was elucidated by the
holding that "it is a rule of the common law, founded on natural justice, that no man shall be
prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine").
76 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
77 Id. at 51.
78 id.
79 Id. (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY (1828)).
80 id.
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some "interim uncertainty" interpreting and applying this new rule.8' He
did explain, however, that a "testimonial" statement is a statement that
provides "testimony," as a witness would in court.82 Thus, "testimonial"
statements trigger the defendant's confrontation rights as though she were
confronting a witness against her at trial.83  Moreover, Scalia also
recognized that despite this shift in confrontation jurisprudence, statements
falling under firmly rooted hearsay exceptions could still be admissible at
trial even without confrontation. 84
2. Davis v. Washington: A Clarification?
Two years after the Crawford decision, the Supreme Court elaborated
on its definition of the term "testimonial" when it decided Davis v.
Washington.8 5 The Davis Court held that statements are testimonial when
made during an interrogation whose primary purpose is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.86 By
contrast, statements are non-testimonial when made during an interrogation
whose primary purpose is to "enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. 87
Davis combined two separate cases that involved domestic violence
victims and the statements they made to police officers or government
personnel. In the first case, the victim made statements during a 911 call. 88
In the second case, the victim made statements in an affidavit that she
completed during a police investigation. 89 The Court distinguished between
81 Id. at 68.
82 Id. at 51-52. In this sense, while a casual remark to a friend falls outside the realm of
"testimony," a formal statement to a government officer or a statement "made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial" bears the mark of being "testimonial" in
nature. Id. at 52.
83 Id. at 68-69 (explaining that when "testimonial statements" are at issue, the act of
confrontation is the only "indicum of reliability" that can satisfy the Constitutional
requirements of the Sixth Amendment).
84 Id. at 51.
85 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
86 Id. at 2273-74. The Court went on to find that statements made in a signed affidavit
were testimonial because they constituted a deliberate recounting of past events in response
to police questioning and thus provided an "obvious substitute for live testimony." Id. at
2278.
87 Id. at 2273. The Court held that incriminating statements in response to the
interrogator's questions on a 911 call are not testimonial because they were made for the
purposes of attaining police assistance during an emergency. Id. at 2277.
88 Id. at 2270.
89 Id. at 2272.
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these two types of statements and their contrasting non-testimonial and
testimonial natures by examining the surrounding circumstances in which
each statement was made. In particular, the Court considered the fact that
the first victim made her statements when she was unprotected by the
police, and apparently in immediate danger. Thus, it decided that her
statements were non-testimonial. 90 Conversely, the second victim made her
statements to the police when she was removed from the time of the events
and the danger she described.9' Thus, her statements were testimonial. 92
3. Take-Away Rules from Crawford and Davis
Under the Crawford rule of confrontation, when a witness is
unavailable to testify at trial, his ex parte statements are inadmissible if they
are testimonial in nature. After Davis, a statement is considered testimonial
if it was taken during a non-emergency interrogation for the purpose of
proving past events that are potentially significant for a criminal
prosecution. Consequently, anything an unavailable witness says to a
police officer or any other investigatory official under non-emergency
conditions is testimonial and therefore excludable as evidence at trial.
There are, however, two exceptions to this exclusion. One exception occurs
when the ex parte statements fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception
because Crawford and Davis only overruled the "guarantees of
trustworthiness" component of the Roberts rule. The other exception
occurs when the defendant had a pretrial opportunity to cross-examine the
unavailable witness.
93
III. BEYOND "INTERIM UNCERTAINTY"-APPLYING CRA WFORD TO CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
Over the last three years, the Crawford rule of confrontation has
provoked more than mere "interim uncertainty" for all types of criminal
adjudications.94  However, due to the heightened importance and
unpredictability of admitting child victim testimony, the Crawford decision
has had especially dramatic effects on the prosecution of CSA cases. 95 One
90 Id. at 2279.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) ("Where testimonial evidence is at
issue.., the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and
a prior opportunity for cross-examination.").
94 As of April 17, 2007, Crawford has accumulated 260 negative citing references among
subsequent case law on Westlaw.
95 See Myrna Raeder, Domestic Violence, Child Abuse, and Trustworthiness Exceptions
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consequence is that CSA cases that were up for appeal when the Crawford
decision came down have been reviewed using a different rule of
confrontation than that applied at trial. This shift in standards has led
numerous state appellate and supreme courts to reverse and remand CSA
cases over the past three years.96 Most of these cases involved ex parte
testimony from unavailable child defendants who are no more available to
testify at trial now than they were when the cases were first heard because
the causes of their unavailability are not easily remedied.97 Consequently,
prosecutors are faced with the difficult task of retrying already challenging
cases with even less evidence than they had at first.98
Beyond the immediate disruption these cases have provoked in
criminal appeals, they also sound a clear alarm for the future of CSA trials.
Specifically, prosecutors must figure out how to adapt to, rather than
after Crawford, CRIM. JUST., July/Aug. 2005, at 24 [hereinafter Raeder, Domestic Violence].
(observing that the consequences of Crawford, while felt throughout the criminal justice
system, have had a "unique impact" on domestic violence, child abuse, and elder abuse cases
because it is quite common for victims in those cases to be unavailable as witnesses in the
trial context).
96 See, e.g., People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming
in part, reversing in part, and remanding a CSA conviction); People v. Sharp, No.
04CA0619, 2006 WL 3635393, at *2 (Colo. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2006) (reversing and
remanding a CSA conviction because admission of an unavailable five-year-old child's
videotaped interview with a forensic interviewer violated the defendant's constitutional
confrontation rights); Contreras v. State, 910 So. 2d 901, 905, 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(reversing for error a CSA case in which a father was convicted of sexually abusing his
eight-year-old daughter, on the ground that her videotaped statement to a child protection
worker was "testimonial"); State v. Henderson, 129 P.3d 646, 654 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006)
(review granted Sept. 19, 2006) (reversing for error upon finding that an unavailable child's
videotaped statement was "testimonial"); State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 560 (N.D. 2006)
(reversing and remanding a CSA conviction after the court found that playing a videotape of
the unavailable child's testimony without providing the defendant an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness violated the defendant's constitutional rights to confront his accuser).
But see People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 934 (Colo. 2006) (affirming a CSA conviction upon
finding that in conjunction with the admission of non-testimonial hearsay, admission of a
child's videotaped police interview did not constitute plain error).
97 See, e.g., Sharp, 2006 WL 3635393, at *1 (concluding that the five-year-old victim's
unavailability to testify against her father was determined when the prosecution attempted to
have her testify and it became apparent that she was too traumatized to do so); Blue, 717
N.W.2d at 561 (concluding that a five-year-old child witness's unavailability resulted from
her lack of memory of the abusive events that allegedly took place when she was only four).
98 See, e.g., Contreras, 910 So. 2d at 909-10 (reversing and remanding with the direction
to exclude a child's videotaped statement as a confrontation violation). The State's original
case consisted of the child's ex parte videotaped testimony, her father's confession that he
"molest[ed]" but never penetrated his child, and the mother's testimony that she had seen
them in "stages of undress." Id. at 903-04. No additional evidence was available because
the child was too traumatized to testify in court and the examining physician had found no
physical evidence of sexual abuse. Id.
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circumvent, Crawford, so that they can continue to successfully try CSA
crimes in the post-Crawford era of confrontation. To achieve this end,
three key questions demand attention. First, when are children's ex parte
statements testimonial? Second, can children be made more available to
testify at trial? Third, what is required for a "prior opportunity for cross-
examination" to constitute sufficient confrontation? The majority of
academic attention examining Crawford's effects on CSA trials has thus far
focused on answering the first two questions.99 While these questions will
both will be addressed below, it is the third question-the defendant's prior
opportunity to cross-examine a witness-that will prove most useful in
explaining how children's voices can continue to be heard within the
bounds of the Crawford rule.'00
A. WHEN ARE CHILDREN'S EX PARTE STATEMENTS "TESTIMONIAL"?
In the last three years, courts across the country have interpreted the
above question in a wide variety of ways. Some courts have found
children's statements to be testimonial by looking at the contextual factors
that surround "objective" witnesses-when and where that statement was
shared, to whom the child spoke, and the types of questions asked.' 0' For
99 See, e.g., Carol A. Chase, Is Crawford a "Get Out of Jail Free" Card for Batterers
and Abusers? An Argument for a Narrow Definition of "Testimonial, " 84 OR. L. REv. 1093
(2005); Heather L. McKimmie, Repercussions of Crawford v. Washington: A Child's
Statement to a Washington State Child Protective Services Worker May Be Inadmissible, 80
WASH. L. REv. 219, 237 (2005); Lynn McLain, Post-Crawford: Time to Liberalize the
Substantive Admissibility of a Testifying Witness's Prior Consistent Statements, 74 UMKC
L. REv. 1 (2005); Daphne A. Oberg, Working Within and Around Utah's Section 76-5-411
After Crawford v. Washington: Assessing the Admissibility of Out-of-Court Statements of
Child Victims of Sexual Abuse, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 1101 (2005); Allie Phillips, Child
Forensic Interviews After Crawford v. Washington: Testimonial or Not?, PROSECUTOR, Aug.
2005, at 17, 21; Raeder, Domestic Violence, supra note 95; Myra Raeder, Remember the
Ladies and the Children Too, 71 BROOK. L. Rev. 311 (2005); Jennifer E. Rutherford,
Unspeakable! Crawford v. Washington and Its Effects on Child Victims of Sexual Assault, 35
Sw. U. L. REv. 137 (2005); Erin Thompson, Child Sex Abuse Victims: How Will Their
Stories Be Heard After Crawford v. Washington?, 27 CAMPBELL L. REv. 279 (2005); Daniel
E. Monnat & Paige Nichols, The Kid Gloves Are Off: Child Hearsay After Crawford v.
Washington, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 18.
100 See discussion infra Section IV; see also Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After
Crawford, 91 VA. L. REv. 747, 783-800 (2005) (addressing potential ways of satisfying a
defendant's prior opportunity for cross-examination in CSA cases); Mosteller, Crawford's
Impact, supra note 11 (identifying how domestic violence cases can incorporate the prior
opportunity to cross-examine unavailable witnesses in an effort to meet the Crawford rule);
Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation
of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 511, 591-97 (2005).
101 See, e.g., State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 329 (Md. 2005) (finding that "an objective
test, using an objective person, rather than an objective child of that age" is the appropriate
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example, if it is clear that the person with whom a child spoke is affiliated
with a governmental agency or with the investigatory process, these courts
are likely to find a child's out-of-court statements testimonial. 0 2 These
courts reason that even if children do not understand the specific legal
implications of their words, their statements nevertheless serve to prove
facts against their abusers at a later criminal trial.'
0 3
Other courts have found children's ex parte statements to be non-
testimonial by distinguishing child witnesses from "objective" witnesses.
These courts focus less on the contextual aspects of the child's statements
and more on the individual child's subjective perception.' 4 Following the
recent Davis decision, however, this line of argument has become rather
attenuated when children's statements to any investigatory official are at
issue because children often make allegations of abuse once that abuse has
become a "past event."' 0 5 Consequently, even in the short period since the
Davis decision came down, several state courts have changed their
approaches to assessing the testimonial nature of children's ex parte
statements, erring more on the side of exclusion than admission.
0 6
test for determining a statement's testimonial nature).
102 See In re R.A.S., 111 P.3d 487, 490 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a child's out-
of-court videotaped statement to a police officer was testimonial within "even the narrowest
formulation of the Court's definition of that term"); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349, 352-53
(Or. 2004) (ruling that a three-year-old's statements to a Department of Human Services
caseworker in the course of a police-directed interview were "testimonial" because under
Crawford, statements made to police officers and by extension government officials for the
purposes of a criminal investigation are inherently testimonial).
103 See, e.g., Mencos v. State, 909 So. 2d 349, 351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding
that statements made in response to an officer's questions were testimonial while statements
overheard by an officer while they were being made to the child's mother were not
testimonial in nature); People v. R.F., 825 N.E.2d 287, 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
(distinguishing statements made to non-governmental personnel such as family members
from statements made to government agents such as police officers, which are testimonial
statements and thus inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause).
104 See, e.g., State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255-56 (Minn. 2006) (finding a child's
statements were not testimonial because neither the child protection worker nor the three-
year-old child victim acted to a substantial degree for the purpose of producing a trial
statement).
105 See, e.g., State v. Hooper, No. 31025 2006 WL 2328233, at *4 (Idaho Ct. App. Aug.
11, 2006) (ruling after Davis that a child victim's statement to a nurse was not admissible
because the nurse was "acting in tandem" with the police investigators to gain evidence of
past events for the potential purpose of a future criminal prosecution).
106 See, e.g., People v. Sharp, 143 P.3d 1047, 1053 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that a
child victim's videotaped statement recounting sexual abuse was not "testimonial" because
the child did not show an indication that she understood the consequences of her statements
or how they might be used to put defendant in jail), vacated, No. 04CA0619, 2006 WL
3635393, at *5 (Colo. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2006) (finding that a child victim's videotaped
statement was "testimonial" because the purpose of the interview was to elicit statements
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Finally, no matter how they determine the testimonial nature of a
child's ex parte statements, courts across the country continue to admit
statements that fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 10 7 The two
types of hearsay exceptions that most regularly apply in CSA cases are the
excited utterance10 8 and medical diagnosis109 exceptions. Though these two
firmly rooted hearsay exceptions can help prosecutors admit children's ex
parte statements in CSA cases after Crawford, both exceptions depend
largely on the unpredictable circumstances in which children disclose
information."10 The most basic differences in revelation scenarios-whom
they tell, when they tell, and where they tell-all conspire either to help or
hinder the possibility that a child's statements, the linchpin in sexual abuse
prosecutions, will be heard if the child is unavailable to testify at trial."'
that would be used at a later criminal trial to convict defendant); State v. Krasky, 696
N.W.2d. 816, 819-20 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that a child's statements to her
examining nurse were "not testimonial" because they were made in the absence of police
presence and the child could not have known that the police were involved), vacated, 721
N.W.2d 916, 919-20 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (ruling that a child's statements to her
examining nurse were testimonial for the following reasons: the police arranged for the
interview to further a criminal investigation of the child's accusation; there was no identified
medical reason for the interview; there was no imminent threat to the safety or welfare of the
child; there was no suspicion that the reported sexual abuse was committed in the recent
past; and the events under investigation were at least two years old). But see State v.
Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 254-56 (Minn. 2006) (reversing in part a post-Crawford but pre-
Davis decision to exclude a child's statement upon finding instead that statements made by a
three-year-old child victim to a child protection worker during a risk-assessment interview
were not testimonial since neither the child nor the interviewer acted to produce a statement
for trial).
107 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 57 (1980); see, e.g., People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 924
(Colo. 2006) (holding that a child victim's statements to an examining physician and to his
father were not "testimonial" because both fell under a firmly rooted hearsay exception).
108 FED. R. EVID. 803(2). The rationale behind the admission of excited utterances is that
when a declarant makes a spontaneous statement in response to an exciting, unpredicted
occurrence, the declarant has not had any opportunity to fabricate the statement and thus it
must be trustworthy. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
MANUAL 16-6 (2005 ed.).
109 FED. R. EvID. 803(4). The rationale behind the medical diagnosis hearsay exception
is that an individual's interests in her own health establishes an incentive to be honest with
doctors. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 108, at 16-18.
110 See, e.g., State v. Kalar, No. 05-0298, 2006 WL 1279149, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May
10, 2006) (finding that a child victim's motive for participating in a videotaped interview
during a medical examination was within the purpose of obtaining treatment for sexual abuse
and thus admissible under the medical hearsay exception). But see State v. Krasky, 721
N.W.2d 916, 924 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that a child's statement to a nurse
practitioner was excludable as "testimonial" evidence because the interview was arranged
through the police and was therefore given for the purpose of proving facts against the
defendant at a future trial under the new Davis standard).
111 In theory, this problem could be avoided if Congress and state legislatures enacted
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Moreover, due to the unpredictable nature of these contextual factors,
prosecutors have little to no control over whether or not children's
statements are testimonial when originally made.'12  The question thus
remains: How can prosecutors ensure that children's voices continue to be
heard in CSA cases while also working within the boundaries of the
Crawford rule?
B. CAN CHILDREN BE MADE MORE AVAILABLE TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL?
Under the Crawford rule of confrontation, obstacles to admitting ex
parte statements only arise when a child is deemed unavailable to appear at
trial. 1 3  By contrast, when a child testifies and is available for cross-
examination at trial, her ex parte statements can be admitted without a
Crawford problem." 4  Accordingly, some commentators have suggested
that placing higher restrictions on children's unavailability, or requiring
children's availability, will help avert the problems that the Crawford rule
of confrontation currently poses for CSA cases.' 1 5 On its face, requiring
children's availability appears to present a reasonable solution for
prosecutors looking to meet Crawford's confrontation requirements while
admitting out-of-court testimonial statements. However, requiring children
to be available to testify at trial is not an appropriate solution for several
reasons.
general CSA hearsay exceptions based on the idea that children's out-of-court statements are
generally more spontaneous than those of adults and by extension must also be more
reliable. This proposal would merely circumvent the Confrontation Clause, however, and
would thus fail to address the inherent rationale behind it-the attainment of reliable
testimony. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 848 (1990); see, e.g., State v. Snowden, 867
A.2d 314, 329-30 (Md. 2005) (rejecting the idea of a "tender years" hearsay exception for
young children's "testimonial" statements on the ground that "concern for the testimonial
capacity of young children overlooks the fundamental principles underlying the
Confrontation Clause"). But see People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687, 693 (Mich. Ct. App.
2004), appeal denied, 688 N.W.2d 829 (Mich. 2004) (concluding in a post-Crawford
decision that though a child's statement to a children's assessment center director did not
specifically fall under any firmly rooted hearsay exceptions, it showed "equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" and was thus admissible under a general
exception to the hearsay rule).
112 WALKER PERRY & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 6, at 163; McKimmie, supra note 99, at
237.
113 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
114 See, e.g., State v. Price, 146 P.3d 1183, 1192 (Wash. 2006) (holding that admission of
testimonial ex parte evidence did not violate the defendant's right to confront all witnesses
against him because the child testified at trial for Confrontation Clause purposes even though
she could not remember the relevant events or her prior disclosures about them).
115 Mosteller, Crawford's Impact, supra note 11, at 414-15 (recommending that
prosecutors work diligently to produce child victims for testimony at trial).
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First, because the problems affecting children's availability are not
easily remedied, requiring child witness availability would most likely have
little effect in making children any more available to testify and would
instead serve only to cause unnecessary trauma. Children's unavailability
usually stems from an inability to express themselves or from extreme
fear-fear of the defendant, the courtroom, or the process of testifying. 16 If
a child were forced to testify despite extreme fear or an inability to express
himself, the experience could be extraordinarily damaging to his
psychological stability. 1 7 Additionally, there is no reason to believe that a
child's forced availability in the trial setting will make his testimony any
more reliable."' In fact, as recognized in Maryland v. Craig, minimizing
children's fear by allowing them to testify in less formal settings, earlier on
in the investigation when their memories of the events are fresher, can
result in greater truth-telling in CSA cases." 19
Second, requiring a child to testify would not necessarily serve the
criminal defendant's best interests. The threshold for finding sufficient
confrontation once a CSA victim testifies in court is typically quite low. 120
116 See, e.g., People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding a
four-year-old child unavailable in a preliminary hearing after she failed to respond to most of
the questions that she was asked, and could not express herself so as to be understood);
Contreras v. State, 910 So. 2d 901, 903 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that having a
child victim testify against her father in a CSA trial would likely have led to her suffering
severe trauma); State v. Henderson, 129 P.3d 646, 649 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding
that the child was unavailable as a witness because she did not understand the proceedings,
the questions, or her duty to testify truthfully); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1)(B) (2000)
(listing grounds for finding unavailability).
117 See, e.g., People v. T.T. (In re T.T.), 815 N.E.2d 789, 795-96 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)
(child victim froze on the stand and could not answer any more questions from the
prosecution after saying that the defendant had tried to unbutton her pants).
118 See Kay Bussey et al., Lies and Secrets: Implications for Children's Reporting of
Sexual Abuse, in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES, supra note 5, at 147, 161-62; Flin, supra
note 63, at 23 (explaining that a highly stressful situation such as testifying in a courtroom
can lead to a child witness's impaired performance).
119 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1990).
120 See, e.g., State v. Painter, No. COA04-896, 2005 WL 2277051, at *4-5 (N.C. Ct.
App. Sept. 20, 2005) (referenced as a decision without publication in 618 S.E.2d 874)
(denying the defendant's motion to strike the child witness's in-court testimony due to his
forgetfulness and hesitancy to respond, finding instead that the child's testimony and cross-
examination were sufficient under the Confrontation Clause because the child appeared to
understand the questions, though he was "in some genuine embarrassment and unwilling to
discuss [the allegations] at that time ... and was doing the best that he could"); State v.
Price, 146 P.3d 1183, 1184-85 (Wash. 2006) (child took the stand and testified as an
available witness at trial but in response to questions pertaining to the alleged abuse she said,
"[m]e [sic] forgot," and "[m]e [sic] forgot again." The defendant subsequently declined his
opportunity to cross-examine the child witness.); see also Mosteller, Crawford's Impact,
supra note 11, at 414 (explaining that under what he calls the "Green-Owens principle,"
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For example, by the time a child testifies at trial, it is not unusual for her to
have a poor memory of events or to be unable to answer questions fully on
cross-examination. Nevertheless, courts often find that a defendant's
constitutional rights have been upheld once a child appears at trial and
provides an opportunity for cross-examination, even if that opportunity is
virtually useless. 1
21
Finally, requiring children to testify at trial could have negative effects
for CSA reporting in general because parents or other guardians might try
to reduce the trauma of being forced to testify at trial by preventing children
from testifying at all. Consequently, just as prosecutors cannot control the
testimonial nature of a child's ex parte statements, it is unwise for courts to
attempt to force the availability of child witnesses in CSA trials.
C. CONCLUSION ON THE CRAWFORD RULE'S FIRST TWO PRONGS
Under the Crawford rule of confrontation, children's once admissible
ex parte statements are now much more frequently excluded for their
"testimonial nature."' 22  Because the causes of children's unavailability
have not changed, however, children are no less likely now than they were
before Crawford to suffer severe trauma from the experience of testifying at
trial. 123  Furthermore, without contradicting Crawford or displacing
society's interest in protecting children, prosecutors and courts cannot
realistically control either the testimonial nature of a child's ex parte
statement or a child's availability to testify at trial. As a consequence,
under the Crawford rule of confrontation children's voices are now
regularly excluded from CSA trials across the country. Within its ruling,
the Crawford Court did, however, include one key alternative means of
admitting testimonial ex parte statements despite witness unavailability.
Specifically, under the third prong of the Crawford rule, by providing
defendants with a "prior opportunity for cross-examination" prosecutors
can still admit an unavailable witness's ex parte testimonial statements. 124
It is this third prong of the Crawford rule that can most significantly bridge
the need for children's voices to be heard in CSA cases with the need to test
the reliability of their statements.
confrontation can be satisfied when children merely take the stand and are subject to cross-
examination, even if they have serious memory loss).
121 See, e.g., Price, 146 P.3d at 1185-86.
122 See discussion supra Section III.A.
123 See discussion supra Section III.B.
124 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); see, e.g., Morales v. State, No. 13-
05-188-CR, 2006 WL 3234073, at *4 (Tex. App. Nov. 9, 2006) (holding that a defendant's
confrontation rights are not violated when the court admits videotaped pretrial testimony'if
the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness).
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IV. DEFINING AND PROVIDING A PRIOR OPPORTUNITY FOR CROSS-
EXAMINATION
A. DEFINING CONFRONTATION AFTER CRA WFORD
The best way to interpret and define how a "prior opportunity for
cross-examination" could constitute sufficient confrontation is by looking at
the language of the Crawford rule.1 25 First, the word "prior" indicates that
confrontation need not take place at trial, but can occur at an earlier
proceeding. Also, the term "opportunity" recognizes that the defendant
need not exercise his right to cross-examination at trial so long as he was
previously provided with an opportunity to do so.126 Furthermore, though
the Court identified the process of cross-examination as the most critical
component of sufficient confrontation,127 this identification was somewhat
clouded by Scalia's focus on the Sir Walter Raleigh trial as a source of
information about the purpose behind the Confrontation Clause. Raleigh
did not ask for an opportunity to cross-examine his accuser. 2 8 Rather, he
focused on the value of requiring the witness to speak his accusations
publicly in the defendant's presence. 129 Consequently, an inference could
be drawn from the Crawford opinion that sufficient confrontation requires
not only cross-examination, but also some opportunity to be confronted
with the witness's direct testimony.
Despite these overarching guidelines, the Crawford Court did not
identify any specific methods of cross-examination that are required to
constitute sufficient confrontation.130  Consequently, in addition to
125 Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) ("Where testimonial evidence is at issue.., the
Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.").
126 See State v. Tobias, No. 89,642, 2004 WL 944019 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2004)
(holding that a defendant's confrontation right was not violated when the defendant
strategically chose not to cross-examine the child).
127 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
128 Id. at 44 (citing Raleigh's pleas to "let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my
accuser before my face.").
129 This emphasis is further supported by the very language of the Sixth Amendment,
which does not guarantee criminal defendants' a right to confront all witnesses, but rather a
right to "be confronted with" the witnesses against them. U.S. CONSr. amend. VI (emphasis
added). For a more detailed analysis of the value of an accuser making his accusation in the
defendant's presence, see Mosteller, Crawford's Impact, supra note 11, at 419 (explaining
that to be sufficient, cross-examination at a prior proceeding must meet the trial "model of
both public accusation and cross-examination").
130 Justice Scalia referenced the "face to face" element of confrontation in his discussion
of the origins of the Confrontation Clause, but that language was not included in the final
Crawford rule. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43.
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reviewing the language of the Crawford decision, it is necessary to consider
prior Supreme Court precedent. Maryland v. Craig remains the most
relevant precedent on this issue as it pertains to CSA cases.131 There are
three main aspects of the Craig decision that provide guidance for
determining what constitutes sufficient confrontation under the Crawford
rule. First, the Craig decision highlighted the Confrontation Clause's
overarching purpose-the attainment of reliable testimony-as the guiding
principle under which sufficient confrontation is established.' 32 Second, the
Craig Court emphasized that oath taking, allowing the trier of fact to watch
the witness answer questions, and cross-examination are all critical
elements of sufficient confrontation. 33 Finally, the Craig Court made it
clear that alternative forms of cross-examination are only acceptable upon a
showing that the witness would likely suffer trauma from face-to-face
cross-examination. 134
B. PROVIDING CONFRONTATION AFTER CRA WFORD
When taken together, the following rule of sufficient confrontation
emerges from the language provided in Crawford and the guidelines offered
in Craig: an unavailable witness's ex parte statements are admissible if the
witness is genuinely unable to testify in court, the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the witness testified under oath,
and both the trier of fact and the defendant could perceive the witness as she
testified.135 Applied to CSA cases, this rule could be accommodated if,
upon finding that a child will likely be unavailable to testify at trial, both
the prosecutor and the defense attorney have a prior opportunity to
videotape the child's sworn pretrial statement and cross-examination. A
required opportunity to videotape would meet each of the Crawford and
Craig procedural requirements for sufficient confrontation. Moreover, this
13 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
132 Id. at 857 (suspending the absolute requirement that confrontation be "face-to-face"
because it frustrated the Confrontation Clause's greater purpose of obtaining reliable
testimony by inhibiting children's abilities to testify).
133 Id. at 845-46 (finding that confrontation requires a combination of several aspects of
reliability testing, including oath taking, physical presence, and the opportunity for the trier
of fact to observe the witness's demeanor); see also Bussey et al., supra note 118, at 149
(explaining that while children might not understand the concept of an oath, most children
over the age of three understand the difference between telling the truth and telling a lie).
134 Craig, 497 U.S. at 855.
135 See Morales v. State, No. 13-05-188-CR, 2006 WL 3234073, at *3 (Tex. App., Nov.
9, 2006) (explaining that the required elements of confrontation include the physical
presence of the witness, an oath, cross-examination, and observation of the witness's
demeanor by the trier of fact).
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rule would facilitate the overarching purpose of the Confrontation Clause-
the attainment of reliable testimony-in three ways that are specific to CSA
cases.
First, the proposed rule would reduce the danger that a child's
testimony will become tainted over time. For example, if a statement is
recorded early on in the investigation, the child is likely to have a fresher
memory of the incidents in question. 36 Additionally, when recorded early,
a child's statement is less likely to be distorted by leading questions and
adult involvement.1
37
Second, recording a child witness's testimony before trial allows the
jurors to observe not only the child's demeanor, but also the interviewer or
attorney's questioning style. 138  Consequently, in contrast to situations
where a child's ex parte testimony is offered only as hearsay from another
witness, by videotaping the pretrial direct and cross-examination, juries can
see whether the interviewer or attorney's questioning style interfered with
the child's responses.
139
Third, the proposed videotaping rule furthers the goal of reliability by
equalizing the playing field between defendants and prosecutors. 140  This
rule would benefit defendants because it would ensure that they have a
chance to test the reliability of unavailable children's statements through
136 See LucY McGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES: FRAGILE VOICES IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM 228 (1994).
137 See Brainerd & Ornstein, supra note 19, at 15 (explaining that through exposure to
other accounts of the event, even accounts offered unintentionally through leading questions,
children's own memories of events can be altered considerably); Myers, supra note 18, at 92
(noting that in the course of a CSA investigation, it is not uncommon for children to be
interviewed at different times by law enforcement personnel, social workers, physicians,
nurses, mental health professionals, prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers, and
family members).
138 Craig, 497 U.S. at 846 (highlighting the importance of allowing the trier of fact to
observe a witness as he answers questions on both direct and cross-examination).
139 See Myers, supra note 18, at 86. Although CSA cases sometimes require that
interviewers use a certain degree of leading questions, the use of a videotape provides the
jurors with a full opportunity to hear both the form and the tone of the questions posed and to
determine for themselves whether children's testimony was influenced by an interviewer.
140 See Frank E. Vandervort, Videotaping Investigative Interviews of Children in Cases
of Child Sexual Abuse: One Community's Approach, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353
(2006). Though he does not address the specific concerns of using video testimony to serve
purposes of confrontation when children are unavailable at trial, Vandervort examines the
advantages that videotaping CSA victim testimony can offer to both prosecutors and
defendants. He focuses in particular on the overarching advantage that this use of
technology poses for the broader community by helping to accurately identify cases of CSA
and by allowing prosecutors and defense attorneys to resolve such cases in a "fair and
balanced manner." Id. at 1364.
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cross-examination. Moreover, the defendant is more likely to elicit
information that may assist him in furthering his defense during an early
examination, when the child may have a better memory of events. 41
Additionally, the proposed rule furthers the goal of efficiency in decision-
making for the defendant because if the prosecutor's case appears weak
based on the recorded pretrial testimony, the prosecutor might consider
offering a plea or dropping the charges altogether.
142
The proposed videotaping rule would also assist prosecutors. For
example, in contrast to their current post-Crawford dilemma, prosecutors
could ensure that their victims' voices are not excluded from trial due to
unavailability or the testimonial nature of a given statement. The preserved
memory and untainted testimony that videotaped recordings offer are also
advantageous for prosecutors whose victims are able to appear at trial
because when a child testifies in court, her testimony can appear
untrustworthy or tainted by external influences. 143 By recording the child's
testimony, the prosecutor can use the video either to refresh the child's
recollection of events prior to trial or as a prior consistent statement to
support the child's trial testimony.1 44 Both techniques allow the prosecutor
an opportunity to preserve the child's credibility as a witness. 45
Additionally, if a child's story comes across well in the videotaped
statement and cross-examination, the recorded statements can provide an
effective plea bargaining tool for prosecutors. 146  This tool is especially
important because when pretrial testimony is not taken in CSA cases, a
prosecutor's ability to work out a plea with the defendant often diminishes
in direct relation to the likely diminishment of the child witness's memory
141 See, e.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 557-58 (8th Cir. 2005) (the child
victim revealed during her video interview that in addition to the defendant, her brother's
friend had also "done bad things to her." This statement perhaps indicated that her
knowledge of sexual activities, which was used against the defendant, did not stem from him
but from the other potential offender.); State v. Price, 146 P.3d 1183, 1185 (Wash. 2006)
(finding sufficient confrontation when the child took the stand and testified as an available
witness at trial but answered "[mie [sic] forgot" to questions).
142 See Lucy McGough, Good Enough for Government Work: The Constitutional Duty to
Preserve Forensic Interviews of Child Victims, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 184-85
(2002).
143 Yuille et al., supra note 5, at 98; see also Donna M. Pence & Charles A. Wilson,
Reporting and Investigating Child Sexual Abuse, FUTURE CHILD., Summer/Fall 1994, at 75,
75 (limiting the succession of interviews a child undergoes also limits the potential
challenges a defendant can make alleging that a child has been "programmed" by the
interviewers).
144 McGough, supra note 142, at 182-83.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 184-85.
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and thus her potential unavailability to testify at trial. 147 Finally, showing a
video of the child's statement to the defendant can sometimes help to elicit
a confession from the defendant. 148
C. CONCERNS
While a rule requiring that both prosecutors and defendants have a
prior opportunity to videotape a child victim's testimony presents clear
advantages for both sides, this proposal also raises certain concerns. To
examine and address these concerns, it is useful to reflect again on the main
interests that need to be safeguarded in any effort to ensure fairness in CSA
trials-namely, the interest in protecting child witnesses while prosecuting
CSA crimes and the interest in upholding criminal defendants'
constitutional right to confront all witnesses against them.
1. Protecting Child Witnesses While Prosecuting CSA Crimes
One potential concern about videotaping children's pretrial direct and
cross-examination testimony is that cross-examination in general,
regardless of whether it occurs prior to or during a trial, could be extremely
traumatic for children.149  Consequently, merely pushing the process
forward will not protect children's best interests. Another concern is that a
child victim of sexual abuse could be particularly vulnerable during cross-
examination early in an investigation. For example, if she has only just
begun to feel safe confiding the details of the abuse to others, it may be
overly traumatizing to undergo the adversarial experience of cross-
examination.15
0
147 See Yuille et al., supra note 5, at 101; Lininger, supra note 100, at 786; see also
Young Victims' Short Memories Complicate Child-Abuse Cases, N.J. REC., Aug. 2, 2004
(citing a case where two child victims had forgotten so much of their testimony after waiting
two years to share it at trial that the prosecutor eventually had to offer their alleged abuser a
plea offer that was about one quarter as severe as what would have been offered had the
original statements been admitted. The article also noted that this is an especially important
consideration given that plea-bargaining accounts for the resolution of approximately 85% of
child sex-crime cases.).
148 Vandervort, supra note 140, at 1361 (citing a study in which about sixty out of
seventy-five child abuse defendants pled guilty after seeing their accusers' videotaped
statements).
149 See Paula E. Hill & Samuel M. Hill, Videotaping Children's Testimony: An Empirical
View, 85 MICH. L. REv. 809, 822 (1987) (noting that "the child is no match for a defense
attorney"). But see WALKER PERRY & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 6, at 153-54 (noting that in
most situations there is an intrinsic check on the adversarial nature of cross-examining
children because juries are likely to sympathize with the witness if it appears that the
defendant or his lawyer are bullying the child).
150 But see Kamala London, Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: What Does the Research
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To accommodate each of these concerns, and to facilitate the child's
ability to answer both direct and cross-examination questions as completely
as possible, the child's pretrial testimony should be taken in an environment
that is comfortable and non-intimidating.'15  If necessary, the cross- and
direct examinations could be conducted by a neutral interviewer who uses a
list of questions submitted by the prosecutor and defense attorney in
advance of the examinations. 52 Alternatively, a neutral interviewer could
receive questions through an earpiece while the defense counsel and
prosecutor remain in another room from which they can observe and hear
the child. 1
53
Another concern with the proposed rule is that even though videotaped
testimony allows the jury to hear the victim's voice in a CSA trial, it is not a
perfect substitute for live testimony. 54  As it pertains to unavailable
witnesses, however, this is a disingenuous comparison. When a child is
unavailable, a prosecutor does not have the option of using videotaped
testimony or live testimony; she must instead decide between using
videotaped testimony or no testimony at all.
155
Finally, requiring pretrial videotaped testimony could disadvantage the
prosecutor's case because she will be forced to reveal her key witness's
testimony well before trial begins. Certain procedural rules can serve to
minimize this problem. In particular, the decision to offer a pretrial
opportunity for cross-examination should fall to the prosecutor. If the
prosecutor chooses not to offer this opportunity, she runs the risk of having
an unavailable key witness and inadmissible ex parte testimony-a far
worse situation than revealing the key witness's testimony in the pretrial
stages. Thus, it is up to the prosecutor to weigh the risk of revealing her
Tell Us About the Ways Children Tell?, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 194, 197 (2005)
(citing study findings that there is little evidence supporting the idea that abused children
typically deny, recant, or re-disclose abuse when asked about it directly).
151 See Flin, supra note 63, at 23; McGough, supra note 142, at 182.
152 See, e.g., Rangel v. State, 199 S.W.3d 523, 537 (Tex. App. 2006) (upholding Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.071, which allows, upon a finding of unavailability,
for both the state and defense attorneys to submit written interrogatories to a neutral
interviewer who will then videotape an interview with the child). But see id. at 544-45
(Dauphinot, J., dissenting and concurring) (arguing that the existing statute fails to
adequately protect defendants' constitutional confrontation rights in light of Crawford
because written interrogatories presented by a neutral interviewer do not constitute
confrontation or cross-examination as mandated in the Constitution).
153 See David C. Raskin & Phillip W. Esplin, Assessment of Children's Statements of
Sexual Abuse, in THE SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN'S RECOLLECTIONS, supra note 7, at 153,
154.




key witness' testimony in the early stages of the trial with the risk of
proceeding to trial without any testimony from that witness.
2. Protecting Criminal Defendants' Constitutional Rights
In addition to concerns about protecting children's best interests while
prosecuting CSA crimes, the proposed rule also raises several concerns for
defendants' rights. For example, juries might focus too much on the
videotaped testimony and thus overlook other important evidence.' 56 In
fact, this is an ongoing problem facing courts today as the use of video
equipment and other technology continue to grow. While minimizing the
influence of technology on jurors is a difficult task, judges can issue jury
instructions explaining the use of the videotape and advising the jurors of
their responsibility not to give the testimony any greater weight merely
because it is shown on a video. Even if jurors do give undue attention to
videotaped testimony, this problem will likely be neutralized by the
proposed rule which provides for an equal opportunity to admit a child's
prior direct and cross-examination by videotape.
Additionally, while videotaped statements can help a defendant by
revealing investigators' poor interviewing techniques, they can also fail to
show the entire interview process and can therefore present biased
perspectives. This problem could be addressed in part by requiring specific
procedures for a pretrial child witness interview to ensure that the videotape
would offer as fair a presentation of the evidence as possible.'57
Furthermore, both parties should be prohibited from editing the pretrial
video recordings.
The proposed videotaping rule could also raise due process concerns if
the defendant is not given a full and fair opportunity to confront the child
witness.158  For example, if a defendant's prior opportunity for cross-
examination occurs before he has completed his discovery process, he could
argue that the cross-examination proceeding failed to constitute sufficient
confrontation. 159 This concern could be resolved in part, however, by
incorporating a rule along the lines of Federal Rules of Evidence 804(b)(1),
which allows the admission of prior testimony from a subsequently
unavailable witness as long at the defendant's prior and present motive to
156 See Pence & Wilson, supra note 143, at 77.
"' See Hill & Hill, supra note 149, at 832-33 (explaining that a fair presentation could
include a prohibition against replaying the child's taped testimony multiple times for the
jurors because that would otherwise be akin to allowing a witness to testify twice at trial).
158 See Mosteller, Crawford's Impact, supra note 11, at 423.
159 See id. at 420.
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examine the witness has not changed. 160 Applied to CSA cases, this would
mean that if new evidence emerges through discovery that is substantial
enough to change the defendant's motive for cross-examining the child
witness after an initial, recorded cross-examination has occurred, the
defendant could request a subsequent opportunity for cross-examination.
Another concern is that if a child's direct and cross-examinations are
taken at two distinct times, it could infringe on the defendant's right to "be
confronted with" all testimony against him. 16' However, this concern can
be avoided by providing the defendant with an opportunity to view the
child's pretrial direct testimony before he assumes his own opportunity to
conduct a cross-examination. Alternatively, before cross-examination
begins, a child witness could be asked to restate her basic accusations
against the defendant before he can proceed with cross-examination.
62
One final concern for criminal defendants is that if videotaping a
child's prior testimony were to become a default rule in all CSA cases,
prosecutors might never have an incentive to produce children as witnesses
at trial. As a result, defendants would be forced to rely on prior cross-
examination as their only means of confronting that witness against them. 1
63
To avoid this problem, judges should apply different standards for
determining a child's likely unavailability and actual unavailability. First,
during pretrial stages prosecutors should bear the burden of showing that a
child will likely be unavailable at trial, thus necessitating the use of
videotape to capture her testimony. 164  The judicial standard for finding
likely unavailability should be broad to accommodate the varied and
unpredictable reasons that children become unavailable to testify.165 Then,
160 FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
161 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see discussion infra Section V.A; see also Mosteller,
Crawford's Impact, supra note 11, at 417-19.
162 Mosteller, Crawford's Impact, supra note 11, at 418.
163 Id. at 423 (explaining that prior examinations should only be permitted to fill the void
of a witness's subsequent unavailability where there is "concrete justification for believing
that the witness' testimony must be preserved at an early time").
164 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57 (2004) (explaining that the government has
an obligation to establish a witness's unavailability); see also Mosteller, Crawford's Impact,
supra note 11, at 426 ("[I]f we move in the direction of securing more prior confronted
testimony, courts will need to be vigilant to ensure that the prosecution does indeed satisfy
its constitutional obligation to show that the witness is unavailable.").
165 See discussion supra Section III.B. For examples of the unpredictable nature of
children's unavailability to testify at trial, see, e.g., Contreras v. State, 910 So. 2d 901, 903
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (despite initial expectations that she would be able to offer
testimony, the child victim was ultimately found unavailable to testify at trial two and a half
years after the child's original statement to the police, and approximately four years after the
date when the child was allegedly sexually abused by her father because she would suffer
severe trauma from the experience); People v. T.T. (In re T.T.), 815 N.E.2d 789, 795-96 (I11.
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at the time of trial the prosecutor should bear the burden of showing that the
child is unavailable as a witness. However, at this stage, judges should
apply a narrower standard for finding actual unavailability to avoid the
prejudice that would ensue for defendants if child witness unavailability
were to become the default rather than the exceptional standard.
D. IMPLEMENTING THE RULE OF CONFRONTATION AFTER CRA WFORD
To implement the proposed rule for recording a child witness's direct
and cross-examinations, legislative steps must be taken on the state level.
As an initial step, any states that currently have statutes prohibiting the act
of videotaping ex parte testimony should repeal those statutes or remove the
relevant language. Additionally, all states that have existing procedures in
place for taking children's recorded testimony should amend those statutes
to ensure that they comply with Crawford.166 As a next step, all states need
to implement the necessary procedures for obtaining a child witness's
pretrial direct and cross-examination testimony. Some states have already
begun to do this, and their practices and procedures can be used as
models. 167
1. Recommended Procedure
While the specific procedures for implementing the proposed
videotaping rule should be determined by individual state legislatures, the
following eight recommended steps are provided as suggestions to facilitate
that process. First, the prosecutor should have the burden of showing a
likelihood that the child will become unavailable to testify at trial. 68
App. Ct. 2004) (child witness's unavailability was not apparent until trial when the child
testified in court that "respondent unbuttoned her pajama suit in [her babysitter's] bedroom,"
but when she was asked what happened next she froze up and stopped responding. Finally,
after it was clear that the child would not respond to any more questions, the prosecutor
asked that the child witness be "deemed and declared unavailable.").
166 For specific information about which states have existing legislation concerning
pretrial procedures in CSA cases, see NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, LEGISLATION
REGARDING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF VIDEOTAPED INTERVIEWS/STATEMENTS IN CRIMINAL
CHILD ABUSE PROCEEDINGS (2004), available at http://www.ndaa-apri.org/pdf/
statuteadmissibility-videotaped interviews statements.pdf
167 See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (Vernon 2005). This statute was
interpreted after Crawford and Davis in Morales v. State, No. 13-05-188-CR, 2006 WL
3234073 (Tex. App. Nov. 9, 2006), which held that the defendant was not denied his
constitutional right to cross-examine the alleged victim when he was offered and accepted
the opportunity to submit questions for a child interviewer to ask during a videotaped pretrial
interview with the child.
168 For examples of criteria on which to find unavailability, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3509(b)(1)(B) (2000); see also G. Melton, Children's Competence to Testify, 44 LAW &
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Second, the judge should apply a broad standard to determine a child's
likely unavailability to accommodate the unpredictability of child
witnesses. Third, if the judge determines that the child might become
unavailable, the prosecutor should have the burden of providing the
defendant with an opportunity to record the child's pretrial cross-
examination. The defendant need not accept this opportunity, but if he
declines it and the child is later deemed unavailable to testify, her ex parte
statements will be admissible regardless of the fact that her testimony has
not been cross-examined.
Fourth, if the defendant accepts the opportunity for cross-examination,
the judge should oversee the process of taking pretrial testimony, either in
person or by reviewing the prosecutor and defense counsel's questions in
advance. Judicial oversight is necessary in this process to distinguish a
prior opportunity for cross-examination from a mere deposition. Fifth, the
defendant must be given not only an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness, but also an opportunity to be confronted with that witness's
testimony. If the judge oversees the pretrial process in person, this
requirement can be satisfied by taking the pretrial direct and cross-
examinations at the same time. If the judge reads the questions before the
examinations take place, the defendant needs to be able to watch the direct
examination before presenting questions to the judge. This method will
allow the defendant a chance to respond to the testimony against him, and it
will ensure that the scope of the defendant's cross-examination does not
reach beyond that of the direct examination.
69
Sixth, if discovery changes substantially after the time that the direct
and cross-examinations have been recorded, the judge should determine
whether a subsequent set of examinations is necessary. Seventh, before
trial, the judge must reexamine the issue of the child's unavailability. At
this stage, the judge should apply a narrower standard to prevent the unfair
prejudice that could ensue if child witnesses are categorically considered
unavailable to offer live testimony in CSA trials. Finally, if the child is still
deemed unavailable to testify, the prosecutor and defendant should be
permitted to admit their recordings of pretrial direct and cross-examination
in lieu of the child witness's live testimony.
V. CONCLUSION
To balance all of the competing interests at stake, CSA trials must
strike a balance between protecting criminal defendants' rights to a fair trial
HUM. BEHAV. 1225-33 (1981) (explaining the steps involved in finding a child unavailable to
offer testimony at trial).
169 See FED. R. EVID. 611 (b).
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and the public's interest in prosecuting sexual abuse while protecting child
victims. Over the past several decades, CSA trials have been continually
plagued by the distribution of advantages that alternate between favoring
one of these interests over another. At first glance, it appears that the recent
decision in Crawford v. Washington merely perpetuates this imbalance by
emphasizing the importance of criminal defendants' constitutional rights to
confront all witnesses against them. However, the Crawford Court
provided a critical safeguard against this problem by allowing a prior
opportunity for cross-examination to satisfy the confrontation requirement.
As a result, instead of perpetuating the distribution of unfair advantages, the
"prior opportunity for cross-examination" component of the new Crawford
rule presents a starting point from which to re-balance the seesaw of
advantages in CSA cases. Meeting this objective hinges, however, on
merging the constitutional provisions set forth in the Confrontation Clause,
and interpreted in Crawford, with the elements of sufficient confrontation
set forth fourteen years earlier in Maryland v. Craig. By implementing a
criminal procedure that allows both prosecutors and defendants a prior
opportunity to videotape unavailable CSA victim testimony, state
legislatures will succeed in integrating all the rules of these two pivotal
cases.
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